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BOOK NOTE
HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY. Edited by Tom Campbell,
David Goldberg, Sheila McLean, and Tom Mullen. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Press, 1st Edition 1986. Pp. 1, 262. $14.95.
Several faculty members of the School of Law, University of Glasgow, have produced a work entitled Human Rights: From Rhetoric to Reality.' This book seeks to define, in concrete terms, the parameters within
which public lawyers and human rights activists should debate human
rights issues. The book examines both the domestic and international
settings. It begins with the thesis that by using rhetoric2 to criticize current social arrangements, activists can provide alternative approaches to
these arrangements based on human rights theories and models. Only
by first formulating clear rights-based policies can activists then work toward implementing them through positive laws.
3
The goals of this book are not merely an exercise in semantics.
They are important ones, because if legislatures and international organizations do not dearly understand a particular right's scope, or cannot
reach a consensus as to the reasons for the existence of a certain right, it
is virtually impossible to create laws which respect that right. Further,
especially in the international context where much human rights language is often idealistic and vague, it is essential for the continuing development of human rights law that clearly stated principles exist
concerning the validity and scope of particular human rights.
The book is organized into eleven chapters. Each chapter concentrates on a particular aspect of the human rights debate. No author has
written more than two chapters; because of this, the book suffers slightly
from a divergence of emphases. While this may seem a somewhat trivial
criticism, it is important because one of the stated purposes of the book,
as the preface explains, 4 is to clarify particular rights and to provide a
concrete basis from which to present social alternatives. The book would
probably be more effective in reaching this goal if each of the individual
authors adhered to a more consistent overall framework.
In order to understand many of the book's themes, the reader
should grasp the "core" concept which Esin Orucu 5 discusses in chapter
1 HUMAN RIGHrs: FROM RHETORIC TO REALrrY (T. CAMPBELL, D.
MULLEN eds. 1986) [hereinafter cited as HUMAN RIGHTS].

GOLDBERG, S. MCLEAN,

T.

2 "Rhetoric may be regarded as the art of expressing, in linguistic form, thoughts and feelings
in ways which most efficaciously communicate them to others. Its objective is persuasion, and its
method is argumentation rather than deliberate manipulation. It seeks to convince, but not to
deceive." HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 1-2.

3 "This book tackles, in concrete contexts, problems which arise in translating the idea of universal human rights into specific practical requirements. It explores ways in which the simple and
uncompromising moral imperatives which are expressed in the rhetoric of human rights may be
applied to actual social circumstances in a manner which can be accurately monitored and adjudicated in courts of law." Id. at preface.
4 Id. See supra note 3.
5 Senior Lecturer in Comparative Law, University of Glasgow.
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three. 6 This useful analytical approach is illustrated, for example, in the
constitutions of West Germany and Turkey. 7 It begins with the presupposition that the essence of a right-its core-is inviolable; that is, the
state may not encroach on the core for any reason. Surrounding the core
is a circumjacence of concomitant rights, and finally at some point away
from this circumjacence is an outer edge. For the state to limit a particular right it must meet certain levels of state interest at each stage or "concentric circle" surrounding the core in order to preserve the right in
question.
The core concept and Orucu's treatment of it is useful for several
reasons. First, it recognizes that the state may have legitimate reasons,
such as state security s for limiting its citizens' freedoms. Second, it provides the individual with a definite area of freedom into which the state
cannot encroach for any reason. Finally, the analytical simplicity of the
concept makes it an easily understandable and thus easily articulable
model, an attribute which lends itself to ready implementation.
The author of this section also argues that, in order to move from
human rights rhetoric to legal reality, a bill of rights or legislation should
positivize the cores of particular rights. Orucu claims that this positivization of the core, although important to lawyers, judges and legislators,
may be more important to ordinary citizens because it would inform
them of the essential content of their rights. This argument is persuasive
because positivization would provide a more consistent application of
rules, provide better notice to citizens, and eliminate or reduce ad hoc
judgments by the judiciary with regard to alleged human rights
violations.
In the first chapter addressing a particular right,9 Noreen Burrows'0
discusses women's rights. She argues persuasively that states and international bodies have incorrectly concentrated on eliminating discrimination against women rather than on defining a body of rights which are
peculiar to women's needs.' 1 She points out that women, whether by
choice or necessity, operate predominately in the domestic sector. Consequently, women need rights that protect their interests in that setting.
Although some countries, such as the United Kingdom, have made advances in this respect (freedom from violence within marriage and easier
availability of abortions), the author claims that these are only preliminary steps in the right direction. Burrows believes, for example, that women should have the right to a minimum wage for child-care and
domestic chores and a right to literacy if they so choose. 12 The author
concludes that only by identifying a group of rights particular to wo6 HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 37-59.
7 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 19/2 (W. Ger.) and TURK. CONST. art. 11/2 (Turk.).
8 HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 43.
9 Id. at 80-98.
10 Lecturer in European Law, University of Glasgow.
11 "[C]oncentration on the elimination of discrimination obfuscates the central issues in respect
of the status of women. These are that women occupy a different place in society from men and that
their role is undervalued or discounted." HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 97.
12 Burrows points out that women make up the majority of the world's illiterates. She argues
that literacy for women would help them assert their individual dignity. Id. at 85-86.
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men's situations and by developing a better enforcement procedure, especially in the international context, will women truly have "equal"
rights.
Burrows' proposals may seem somewhat radical, but her arguments
are clear and cohesive and convincingly supported. If one agrees with
her thesis that women's roles in society are undervalued and that this
inequity should be remedied, it follows that changes should be made in
the present system which more proportionately compensates women for
their contributions, whether these contributions be domestic or public.
In the next chapter,' 3 Sheila McLean 14 discusses the right to
reproduce. Although this right is often framed in terms of the right not
to have the state interfere with reproductive choices, McLean contends
that this right may be increasingly seen as the state's duty to facilitate
reproduction.1 5 She acknowledges that a state may limit reproductive
rights because of other competing rights, such as the right to life of a
viable fetus. She points out, however, that in the twentieth century, with
the advent of technology, some countries have severely restricted or
completely removed reproductive choices from individuals.' 6 She illustrates these restrictions by comparing the status of the right to terminate
pregnancy in the United States (where the individual has complete freedom of choice in the first trimester) with the United Kingdom (where the
medical profession largely circumscribes that decision). Because she advocates a rights-based approach to reproduction and individual autonomy in reproductive choices, McLean appears to favor the United States'
approach. The British approach places an artificial restriction upon a
woman's decision and thus encroaches on the core of the right to
reproduce without a sufficient reason. Under any personal autonomy
analysis, the United States' approach seems the better reasoned. McLean
concludes the section by noting that in this area, as in other areas of
17
human rights, rhetoric may have only limited practical significance.
Though this assertion may well be true, it is troublesome because one of
the book's main themes is that rhetoric can be a powerful force for social
change.
McLean also authored the section on the right to consent to medical
treatment.' 8 The relationship between the doctor and patient is, she rec13 Id. at 99-122.
14 Lecturer in Forensic Medicine and Science, University of Glasgow; Director of the Institute of
Law and Ethics in Medicine; and editor of LEGAL ISSUES IN MEDICINE (1981).
15 HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 99.
16 McLean does not specify which countries she is referring to, but countries such as China and
India have severely limited the number of children a couple may have. The Indian province of
Maharashtra provides for compulsory sterilization of the male after the birth of a couple's third
child. If the father refuses the operation, the mother is obliged to undergo a tubectomy. The sanctions for failure to comply with these laws are up to six months in prison or a fine of 100 to 500
rupees. For a full discussion of this law and other reproduction restrictions, see Note, India's Compulsory Sterilization Laws: The Human Right of Family Planning, 8 CAL. W. INT'L. L.J. 342 (1978).
17 McLean notes that human rights rhetoric's most practical value is as a "method of highlighting the problem of removing existing capacities .... " but recognizes that a paradox faces human
rights practitioners: The state is not only the one who has fostered the need for human rights protections, but is also going to have to be the main force in guaranteeing reproductive rights. HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 120.
18 Id. at 148-72.
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ognizes, nearly always dominated by one party, the doctor, who possesses a much greater degree of information and technical expertise than
the patient. Consequently, in order for the patient to determine his own
medical treatment, the doctor-patient relationship must have a high degree of trust. She contends that not only must the patient trust the doctor, the doctor must trust that the patient can cope with potentially
negative diagnoses and be able to make decisions that affect his or her
bodily integrity. She also argues that doctors must fully disclose to the
patient in order for the patient's consent to be properly termed "informed." She argues that even if the patient does not completely understand all of the information that he receives, it may lead to a fuller
discussion about the proposed treatment. This area of human rights debate is in part different from other areas because it is seen as a balancing
of competing "goods"-the medical profession and the law.' 9 It may
therefore serve as the classic example of the types of decisions which
occur that limit the application of human rights laws.
A somewhat related or perhaps complementary chapter concerns
the rights of the mentally-ill, 20 who are often not able or not allowed to
exercise treatment choices. Tom Campbell 2 ' points out that this is a very
problematic area of human rights debate. He suggests that when people
lose the capacity to reason, their very humanity, which is at the base of
any human right, is put in issue. 2 2 Campbell explains that it is difficult to
fit the mentally-ill into any existing model of rights. It is incorrect, he
maintains, to treat them as children, especially when considering illnesses such as schizophrenia or manic depression which are often episodic in character. With these types of mental illnesses, the patient at
times is as lucid and rational as a "normal" adult. It is equally incorrect,
however, to place the mentally-ill in with the traditional model of man as
a rational self-interested person free to communicate views and pursue
individual happiness. 23 Another model, the "autonomy model," attempts a compromise by allowing the mentally-ill to exercise the same
rights as other people in areas in which they remain normal. 24 Campbell
maintains that this approach fails to consider any of the specific problems
that the mentally ill face, and fails to offer reasons why society should
protect their interests at all. Campbell seems to advocate an interest or
19 McLean is merely pointing this out as a contrast between most human rights which are seen as
a conflict between something inherently dangerous or wrong (abuse of power by the state, for example) and the individual's right to personal autonomy. Id. at 148.
20 Id. at 123-47.
21 Professor ofJurisprudence, University of Glasgow; and author of SEVEN THEORIES OF HUMAN
SociETY (1981).

22 "The rights of the mentally-ill are problematic because the humanity of those who have lost
the capacity to reason may be questioned." HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 123.
23 "In fact, the model of Man traditionally associated with those who favour civil rights is of a
person somewhat beyond the 'norm' in the sense of the normal: an active, rational and entrepreneurial person for whom the life which is claimed is one in which there is a degree of selfexpression, self-help, and self-defense: the opportunity to have and to manage property, to communicate views and pursue happiness along individually chosen lines, to share in government and freely
go about day-to-day activities without the interference of officials and prohibitions of the state beyond those strictly necessary for the defense of the rights of others." Id. at 126.
24 For example, under the "autonomy model" there is no reason to restrict mentally-ill people's
voting rights or the right to communicate with others.
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benefit theory25 of rights because not only is it consistent with the direction in which current debate is heading, but also because it pushes the
debate toward viewing
rights as positive duties of the state to accommo26
date its citizens.
This point relates also to Campbell's belief that the state should focus less on curing mental illness and more on preventing it.27 He mentions that one way the state could accomplish this goal is by attempting
to remove some of the stresses from society, but he does not fully elaborate on this point. This approach parallels the current emphasis that
governments place on the prevention of physical ailments, such as lung
cancer and various diseases by publishing information and warnings
about cigarette smoking and providing vaccination programs for citizens.
Campbell should realize, however, that the causes of mental illness are
much less clear than the causes of most physical illnesses, and that it is
virtually impossible for governments to remove stress from society.
Thus, his suggestion is much easier said than done.
Campbell concludes this section with a word of caution: Human
rights activists subscribing to an interest or benefit theory must be careful to monitor paternalistic practices designed to protect the mentally-ill
from themselves. This vigilance is necessary, he contends, in order to
prevent the state from using the label "mentally-ill" as a pretext for intervening in irrational people's lives merely because they do not conform
to society's norms. 28 Here, Campbell's concern may be overstated, but
he apparently makes this point to emphasize the importance of specific
procedural safeguards against such an occurrence.
The next chapter 29 deals with the right to public procession and assembly. The author, Jim Murdoch,3 0 lists four areas where this right generally applies: Freedom of association, static meeting, public procession,
and protection against criminal sanctions following a march or
3
meeting. '
Although these rights are similar in terms of what people need in
order to freely exercise them, the differences among them require a
slightly different analytical approach, which Murdoch provides.3 2 He argues that guaranteeing that the state does not intrude on the right to
peaceful protest encourages citizens to participate in governmental decisions, and acts as an effective safety value for what otherwise might be
violent protests. He notes, however, that groups which use violent tac25 The "interest" or "benefit" theory bases humanness not on rationality, but on the ability to
suffer. Because the mentally-ill are often incapable of alleviating their own suffering, this theory
dispenses with the requirement that the right-holder exercise a right. Instead, this theory views
rights as rule-defended interests which obligate the state to take appropriate action to protect the
individual right-holder. HUMAN RIGrs, supra note 1, at 131.
26 Id. at 131, 144.
27 Id. at 144.
28 Id. at 145.
29 Id. at 173-96.
30 Lecturer in Public Law, University of Glasgow.
31

HumAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 174.

32 For example, the right to static meetings generally does not interfere with other citizens'
rights to use public highways, but the rights to public procession involve balancing these competing
interests. Id. at 184-92.
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tics to gain publicity and a sympathetic following present analytical
problems for activists who are developing rights-based theories regarding the right to protest. This section may not be as understandable to
American readers because much of the argument centers on British social history, and, of course, Britain lacks a written constitution and declaration of rights. Much of this section discusses the relative merits of a
written constitutional system in terms of human rights-a system whose
merits are probably well known to Americans. Similarly, Murdoch
presents more of an historical perspective on how these rights have developed (or in some cases declined) in Great Britain rather than defining
a core of rights which might be more useful to non-British activists and
more consistent with other sections of the book.
In chapter ten,33 Gerry Maher3 4 discusses human rights in the criminal process. He focuses in part on two British case studies 35 as a basis for
analysis. Maher contends that human rights discourse has not played an
important role in this area of law because lawyers and judges have been
chiefly concerned with finding facts accurately and applying rules consistently. This is so, he believes, because of the influence of Utilitarianism
and Positivism in British legal history. He points out that, because maximizing utility might entail piercing the core of a certain right, it clashes
with the very nature of the core philosophy. Similarly, according to
Maher, since Positivism stands for the idea that rights can only exist as
posited rules, it conceptually confuses the Positivist to maintain that people have legal rights merely by virtue of their common humanity.
Maher devotes much of this chapter to explaining how human rights
rhetoric can indeed be incorporated into the criminal process as an alternative analytical framework. He cites, for instance, Gideon v. Wainwright,3 6 where the United States Supreme Court provided, as a rationale
for requiring appointed counsel, that the trial might not result in the
proper outcome if the accused was not represented. 3 7 Maher attempts to
introduce an approach to this issue that is based on the moral autonomy
of the accused. He then proposes that if one considers a criminal trial to
be a conversation between the accused and the state, it is essential to the
autonomy of the accused that he fully understand the proceeding. He
concludes that, in order to facilitate this understanding, the state has a
duty to appoint counsel if the accused cannot afford to hire counsel himself.3 8 Of course, Maher and the other authors must first convince read33
34

Id. at 197-222.
Lecturer in Jurisprudence, University of Glasgow.

35 Maher focuses on the work of the CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, ELEVENTH REPORT,
EVIDENCE (General), 1972, Cmnd. No. 4991. and the (Thompson) COMMITrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN SCOTLAND, SECOND REPORT, 1975 Cmnd. No. 6218. The former studied the accused's right
to remain silent in criminal proceedings, and the latter the practice of holding a suspect for questioning without formally charging him. Maher uses these reports to show how human rights analysis has

had virtually no impact on criminal procedures policies.
36 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
37

38

Id. at 344-45.

In discussing the need for legal aid, Maher asks:
[I]f we argue . .. that our criminal process must display respect for the autonomy of the
person on trial, a different justification for legal aid emerges. By treating the accused as an
autonomous agent, we must communicate reasons to him or her why it is that proof of guilt
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ers and governments that individual autonomy as an end in itself is a
valuable or morally good societal goal. Although this section might unnerve Positivists and Utilitarians, it is exceptionally well-written and provides sound arguments for using human rights theory as a method to
analyze the criminal process.
The book concludes with a section on the right to trade union membership.3 9 Elspeth Attwooll 40 claims this right is merely a specialized
form of the right to freedom of association. She defines the core of the
right as that "ofjoining and continuing to belong to any combination '41
of
any type in support of economic interests held in common by workers.
Attwooll recognizes that in this area, perhaps more than others, the
rights which go along with the core right may be of equal importance.
She notes, for instance, that it does workers very little good to have a
right to strike if the penalty for striking is dismissal, or to have the right
to meet if management or the government does not provide the time or
the place for such meetings. She also points out the conceptual difficulties of this right when unions try to exclude particular individuals. This
difficulty arises because the very definition of the core-that workers can
form "any" combination-seems to imply that a union can arbitrarily exclude anyone it chooses. But, she notes, this might encroach on the individual's own right to join. Attwooll distinguishes trade unions from
other groups, such as employer associations, by contending that the particular needs of trade unions require a different core of rights to remain
effective.
Attwooll explains why workers need particular rights. She does not,
however, fully explain why workers, as such, are intrinsically different
from the rest of the population and therefore deserve their own unique
rights, except to assert that trade union rights are generally accepted in
the international community. 4 2 This section would be more persuasive if
Attwooll first convinced the reader that trade union membership and
workers, as workers, had some particular trait that set them apart from
others and indicated that they deserved unique protection.
Taken as a whole, the book is difficult to digest. It is full of useful
information and interesting theoretical discussions, but wanders away
from its central thesis more than occasionally. It seems that the authors
go out of their way to use some of the concepts and terms outlined in the
introduction, when they would be more comfortable with their own, or at
least another, analytical framework. In other words, if the book had not
set out to be consistent (for example, if the editors had called this a "collection of essays"), reader expectations might have been different and
against him or her is being carried out. To the extent that the accused cannot fully understand or participate in a trial without legal aid, then respecting that person's autonomy calls
for provision of legal aid. Legal aid is not on this view simply a means to an end (such as
fact-finding) but is something due to an accused as of right, such a right deriving from the
need to respect someone's moral autonomy.
HUMAN RIGHwS, supra note 1,at 219.
39 Id. at 223-49.

40 Senior Lecturer in Jurisprudence, Unviersity of Glasgow.
41

HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 226.

42 Id. at 223.
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the reader may have felt more at liberty to pick and choose particular
"essays" or chapters to read without fear of missing some overall themes.
It turns out, however, that each chapter, with the possible exception of
chapter three, 43 can be read independently of any other.
The very title of the book, however, implies that rhetoric can be a
powerful force for social change. In critiquing this position, one must
look beyond the book, to reality, to see how particular rhetoric has influenced it. The process of social change is, of course, a gradual one and
thus the true contribution of this book may not be known for some time.
With regard to several chapters of this book-the chapters on women's
rights, rights of the mentally-ill, and human rights in the criminal process-it may very well be worth the wait.
Jeffrey M. Heutmaker*

43 The reader should be sure to read chapter three because it defines the "core" concept of
human rights used throughout the book.
* Completed while a student at the University of Notre Dame Concannon Program of International Law, London, England.

